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In re K.I.: An Urgent Need for a
Uniform System in the Treatment of
the Critically Ill Infant-Recognizing
the Sanctity of Life of the Child
By ANGIE L. GUEVARA*
The primary concern of physicians caring for children must be the
best interests of the individual child. All infants and children have
intrinsic value and deserve our respect and protection. This is true
whether or not they are handicapped or have the potential to be
handicapped and regardless of whether this handicap is physical or
mental. This means that all children, regardless of handicap either
actual or potential, have a justified claim to life and therefore to
such medical treatment as is necessary to either improve or pro-
long life.'
AS SAD AS it is, the above quoted premise is not widely held. In-
stead, the general view is that medical treatment should be withheld
from critically ill newborns. The focus of this Note, In re K.I.,2 is a case
involving an infant born in Missouri with several treatable ailments. It
is just one of a long list of cases in which medical treatment was with-
held from a child deemed unworthy of life-sustaining treatment. In
fact, the case follows a troubling and checkered history of court cases
and legislative attempts to deal with the problem of critically ill chil-
dren. This case is of particular importance because the decision to
* Class of 2001. This Note is dedicated to the author's mother, Julia Guevara, and
her sister, Perla Guevara-her pillars of strength, her role models, her everything-for
their virtue, courage, love, support, and encouragement; to Maria Jimenez for her
friendship and understanding; and to Debra Johnson, Melanie Slaton, Gina DeVito, and
Carol Wilson for their example, graciousness, faith, and trust in her.
1. Bioethics Committee, Canadian Paediatric Society, Treatment Decisions for Infants
and Children, at http://www.cps.ca/english/statements/B/b86-Ol.htm (reaffirmed Feb.
2000).
2. 735 A.2d 448 (D.C. 1999).
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withhold treatment was made by the state, rather than the child's
parents.
This Note focuses on the court's failure to adopt and follow a
uniform system in ordering treatment for critically ill infants. This
Note argues that the United States Supreme Court's opinion in the
seminal case of Cruzan v. Missouri Department of Health3 is applicable to
the case of the critically ill infant. In Cruzan, the Court recognized the
sanctity of an individual's life and affirmed the proscription against
the use of substituted judgment in the absence of substantial proof
that the decision to forego life-sustaining treatment reflects the wishes
of the patient.4 Although it is conceded that Cruzan concerned an
adult woman whose parents wanted her removed from life-sustaining
equipment, this Note is premised on the view that infants should be
accorded the same respect. No one-not parents, hospital, or state-
should negate a child's right to medical treatment, particularly when
the child has a chance of survival, nor should they decide when and
how the child should die.
Part I of this Note is devoted to an overview of the treatment by
the United States legal system of the critically ill newborn beginning
with the case of the Bloomington Baby.5 Part II of this Note discusses
In re K.. 6 Part III analyzes the principles espoused in In re K.L, includ-
ing the traditional role of parents and the development of the state's
role as parens patriae in child neglect cases. Part III also argues that
the KI. court departed from current practices in terminating parental
rights. Finally, in Part IV, the Cruzan principle-which encourages re-
spect for life-is discussed and applied to the case of the critically ill
infant. In particular, Part IV suggests that the child's perspective must
be considered by the medical profession when deciding whether to
treat the critically ill child.
I. Background: The Fate of the Critically Ill Child Since the
Death of the Bloomington Baby
It has been over seventeen years since the public first heard about
the horror of withholding medical treatment from critically ill
newborns. The matter came to public attention in 1982 with the death
3. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
4. See id. at 280.
5. See THOmAs A. NAZARIO, IN DEFENSE OF CHILDREN 79-80 (Charles Scribner's Sons
ed., 1988).
6. 735 A.2d 448 (D.C. 1999).
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IN RE KI.
of a Bloomington, Indiana, infant ("Bloomington Baby").7 The infant
male was born with Down Syndrome and an esophageal obstruction
which prevented oral feeding.8 Although the obstruction was revers-
ible, the Bloomington Baby's parents refused treatment rather than
consent to life-preserving surgery.9 Alarmed by the parents' resolu-
tion, the hospital sought a court order to force treatment.' 0 The
court, however, sided with the parents and concluded that the parents
had not neglected their child under the state's child neglect stat-
utes." l While the hospital appealed the trial court's decision,1 2 all nu-
trients, hydration, and treatment were withheld from the
Bloomington Baby for six days until he died on April 15, 1982.13 Since
the death of the Bloomington Baby, many other children have suf-
fered a similar fate, albeit under different legal standards and
theories.
A. The Reagan Administration and Section 504:14 The Case of
Baby Jane Doe
Shock over the Bloomington Baby's death caused a flurry of legis-
lative efforts to prevent the practice of withholding medical treatment
from disabled newborns. The first of these endeavors occurred on
May 18, 1982, under a mandate of the Reagan administration,
whereby the Director of the Department of Health and Human Ser-
vices ("DHHS") issued a notice to federally funded hospitals "re-
minding" them that newborn infants with handicaps were protected
by section 504 of the 1973 Rehabilitation Act ("section 504").15 Sec-
tion 504 states, in pertinent part,
7. See NAZARIO, supra note 5, at 79.
8. See id.
9. See id. at 79-80.
10. See Janna C. Merrick, Critically Ill Newborns and the Law, 16 J. LEGAL MED. 189,
194-95 (1995).
11. See id. at 195 n.20.
12. See id. at 195. The United States Supreme Court denied the petition for certiorari.
See Infant Doe v. Bloomington Hosp., 464 U.S. 961 (1983).
13. See NAzAiuo, supra note 5, at 80 (The child's parents refused to allow doctors to
feed the child intravenously. "[I]nstead a note was placed by his bed which read, 'Do not
feed, provide liquids, or any medical care.' It took six excruciating long days for little In-
fant Doe to die. For four of those six days he cried; on his last day, he simply starved to
death.").
14. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1994).
15. The notice warned hospitals that they would be in violation of section 504 if they
disallowed such infants to remain in their care after the child's parents or guardian with-
held consent to treatment. See Bowen v. Am. Hosp. Ass'n, 476 U.S. 610, 617 (1986).
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[n]o otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United
States ... shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded
from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be sub-
jected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance or under any program or activity con-
ducted by any Executive agency or by the United States Postal
Service. 16
The reminder, soon codified as the "Interim Final Rule,"' 7 required
hospitals to post signs in maternity and pediatric units advising per-
sons aware of children denied food or care to contact a twenty-four
hour hotline or child protective services. 18 Several medical organiza-
tions successfully challenged the rule on purely procedural grounds in
American Academy of Pediatrics v. Heckler.19 The plaintiffs alleged, and
the court agreed, that the DHHS failed to provide public notice of the
rule or a thirty day waiting period for its implementation. 20
Undeterred by the Heckler challenge, the DHHS redrafted the
rule in 1983 and invited public comment.2 1 The "Final Rule," as it
came to be known, maintained the same reporting requirements as its
predecessor and required federally assisted state child protective ser-
vices agencies to exercise their full authority under state law to pre-
vent instances of medical neglect of handicapped infants. 22
While the DHHS was in the process of promulgating the Final
Rule, the applicability of section 504 to cases concerning disabled in-
fants was tested in the 1983 case of Weber v. Stony Brook Hospital.23
There, Baby Jane Doe, an infant girl, was born with several disorders,
including spina bifida,24 hydrocephalus, 25 and microcephaly. 2 6 Al-
though surgery was an option to correct several of the child's ail-
ments, her parents opted to withhold surgery and treat their daughter
with antibiotics. 27 The parents' decision to withhold surgery was chal-
16. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a).
17. Bowen, 476 U.S. at 618.
18. See id.
19. 561 F. Supp. 395 (D.D.C. 1983).
20. See id. at 400-01.
21. See Bowen, 476 U.S. at 619.
22. See id.
23. 467 N.Y.S.2d 685 (App. Div. 1983).
24. Spina bifida is a surgically correctable medical condition characterized by "a fail-
ure of closure of the bones and the coverings of the spinal cord." Id. at 686.
25. Hydrocephalus is a medical "condition in which fluid fails to drain from the cra-
nial areas" and which can be relieved by surgical procedure. Id.
26. Microcephaly is a medical condition characterized by "a small head circumfer-
ence." Id.
27. See id.
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lenged in Suffolk County's Supreme Court.28 A guardian ad litem for
the infant was appointed to consent to the surgeries. 29 The Weber
court vacated the appointment of the guardian and held that the par-
ents' choice to withhold surgery was in the infant's best interest.30 The
DHHS subsequently filed charges against University Hospital3' for re-
fusing to make available Baby Jane Doe's medical records for inspec-
tion.3 2 The court held that the hospital had not violated section 504,
because it was at all times willing to perform the surgical procedures
and was impeded in this pursuit only when the parents refused to
consent.3
3
The Final Rule was set aside by court order the following year in
the case of United States v. University Hospital.34 There, the government
appealed the district court's decision that the hospital had not vio-
lated section 504 by refusing the DHHS access to Baby Jane Doe's
medical records.35 The court held that Congress did not intend sec-
tion 504 to apply to cases in which treatment is denied to "defective"
newborns, nor did it require hospitals to monitor the medical treat-
ment of such infants. 36 Instead, the court reasoned that section 504
was meant only to prevent discrimination against handicapped adults
and older children and protect their access to federal programs.37
In 1986, the United States Supreme Court finally laid to rest the
debate over the Final Rule's authority under section 504. In Bowen v.
American Hospital Ass'n,38 the Court held that section 504 did not au-
thorize the investigative actions proposed by the DHHS and that the
rule was invalid.39 Moreover, the Court held that the Final Rule was
not needed to prevent hospitals from denying treatment to handi-
capped infants as no evidence was presented by the director of the
DHHS showing that hospitals discriminated against handicapped
newborns. 40 Instead, the Court found that in the forty-nine Baby Doe
28. See id.
29. See id.
30. See id. at 687.
31. The full name of Stony Brook Hospital is University Hospital, State University of
New York at Stony Brook.
32. See United States v. Univ. Hosp., 575 F. Supp. 607 (E.D.N.Y. 1983).
33. See id. at 614.
34. 729 F.2d 144 (2d Cir. 1984).
35. See id. at 146.
36. See id. at 157-58.
37. See id. at 159, 161.
38. 476 U.S. 610 (1986).
39. See id. at 647.
40. See id. at 632-34.
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cases cited by the DHHS, there were no instances in which a hospital
refused to treat an infant after a parent consented to treatment. 41 The
Court reasoned, "[a] hospital's withholding of treatment when no pa-
rental consent has been given cannot violate [section] 504, for with-
out the consent of the parents or a surrogate decision maker the
infant is neither 'otherwise qualified' for treatment nor has he been
denied care 'solely by reason of his handicap.' "42 In retrospect, the
focus of the Final Rule was misplaced. It targeted hospitals rather than
parents who refused to consent to the medical treatment of their chil-
dren. The Final Rule did nothing to prevent the fate of future Bloom-
ington babies.
B. The Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act-Congressional
Reaction: The Case of Baby Lance Steinhaus
While protection of handicapped infants was being argued under
section 504, Congress restructured existing anti-child abuse laws in
1984 to include the withholding of treatment from critically ill in-
fants. 4 3 The 1984 Amendments to the Child Abuse Prevention and
Treatment Act 4 4 ("CAPTA") characterized the failure to treat disabled
infants as a form of child abuse. 45 CAPTA defined medical neglect as
the "failure to respond to the infant's life-threatening conditions by
providing treatment (including appropriate nutrition, hydration, and
medication) which, in the treating physician's (or physicians') reason-
able medical judgment, will be most likely to be effective in ameliorat-
ing or correcting all such conditions. ' 46 But while the new provisions
purported to halt the withholding of medical treatment to infants,
they were not all inclusive. Doctors and medical personnel were af-
forded the freedom to exercise their medical judgment to withhold
treatment from infants who were chronically and irreversibly coma-
tose; those who would not benefit from any treatment but whose lives
would only be prolonged; and those who would not survive treatment,
the application of which would be considered futile and inhumane. 47
In 1986, CAPTA was tested in the case of a Minnesota baby boy,
Lance Steinhaus.48 The child lapsed into what his doctors diagnosed
41. See id. at 634.
42. Id. at 630.
43. See Merrick, supra note 10, at 200.
44. 45 C.F.R. § 1340.15 (1998).
45. See id. § 1340.15(b)(1).
46. Id. § 1340.15(b) (2).
47. See id. §§ 1340.15(b) (2) (i)-(iii).
48. See Merrick, supra note 10, at 201.
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as a persistent vegetative state ("PVS") after being beaten by his father
at five weeks of age.49 Convinced that Lance would not recover, his
doctors filed a petition for a "Do Not Resuscitate Order" ("DNR")
with the court. Lance's mother joined in the petition. 50 The judge
denied the petition on grounds that the infant did not meet the
CAPTA exception for patients who are chronically and irreversibly co-
matose, as he was diagnosed only as PVS by his physicians.51 A month
later, Lance's doctors and mother filed a motion to amend the order
to change Lance's condition from PVS to chronically and irreversibly
comatose, and to state that the withholding of treatment would not
constitute medical neglect.52 The court subsequently amended the or-
der to show that the child met the CAPTA exception and instructed
that medical attention be withheld.53 Baby Lance Steinhaus died in
February 1987. 54
C. Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act:
The Case of Baby K
In 1992, a Virginia court held that CAPTA may be raised only by
the appropriate child protective services agency and denied its appli-
cation in a case involving a hospital which sought a court order to
discontinue the treatment of a baby girl born with anencephaly.55
Born on October 13, 1992, Baby K was kept on mechanical ventilation
at the request of her mother due to respiratory distress. 56 The hospital
urged Baby K's mother to permit a DNR in order to terminate ventila-
tor treatment as no therapeutic or mitigating purpose was served by
continued treatment. 57 When Baby K's mother objected to the doc-
tors' request, they transferred the child to a nursing home on the con-
dition that the baby be readmitted to the hospital for respiratory
difficulties. 58 By April 1993, Baby K was treated for respiratory distress
twice. 59 The hospital sought declaratory and injunctive relief under
49. See id.
50. See id.
51. See id.
52. See id.
53. See id.
54. See id. at 202.
55. See In re Baby K, 832 F. Supp. 1022, 1029 (E.D. Va. 1993). Anencephaly is a "con-
genital malformation in which a major portion of the brain, skull, and scalp are missing."
In re Baby K, 16 F.3d 590, 592 (4th Cir. 1994).
56. See In re Baby K 832 F. Supp. at 1025.
57. See id.
58. See id.
59. See id.
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four federal statutes, including section 504,60 CAPTA, the Americans
with Disabilities Act 61 ("ADA"), and the Emergency Medical Treat-
ment and Active Labor Act 62 ("EMTALA"), to allow it to discontinue
"futile treatment" of the infant.63
The EMTALA requires that hospitals provide stabilizing medical
treatment to any person who comes to an emergency department in
an emergency medical condition when treatment is requested on the
person's behalf.64 The court held that, under EMTALA, the use of a
mechanical ventilator is not futile or inhumane in relieving the symp-
toms of respiratory difficulty.6 5
On appeal, the court upheld the trial court's decision.66 The ap-
pellate court maintained that the hospital had a duty to provide treat-
ment to prevent material deterioration of the patient.67 In the case of
Baby K, therefore, the hospital's duty was to prevent deterioration of
the baby's respiratory condition without regard to her anencephalic
condition. 68 "Uniform treatment of emergency medical conditions [,]"
the court concluded, "... require [d] the [h] ospital to provide Baby K
with the same treatment that [it] provides all other patients exper-
iencing [respiratory distress]."69 A tracheotomy and implantation of
an endotracheal tube were eventually performed on Baby K and, as of
60. See id. at 1027. The court held that the hospital's wish to withhold ventilator treat-
ment from Baby K over the mother's objection would violate section 504 because the child
was "otherwise qualified" under the Act. See id. at 1028.
61. 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (1994). The ADA provides, "no qualified individual with a disa-
bility shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the
benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrim-
ination by any such entity." Id. The court held that the ADA:
does not permit the denial of ventilator services that would keep alive an
anencephalic baby when those life-saving services would otherwise be provided to
a baby without disabilities at the parent's request. The Hospital's reasoning would
lead to the denial of medical services to anencephalic babies as a class of disabled
individuals. Such discrimination against a vulnerable population class is exactly
what the American with Disabilities Act was enacted to prohibit.
In re Baby K, 832 F. Supp. at 1029.
62. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(b) (1994).
63. See In re Baby K, 832 F. Supp. at 1027.
64. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a).
65. See In re Baby K, 832 F. Supp. at 1027.
66. See In re Baby K, 16 F.3d 590, 598 (4th Cir. 1994).
67. See id. at 595.
68. See id.
69. Id. at 596.
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the date of the final ruling, she had not returned to the hospital for
breathing assistance.70
D. Child Neglect: The Case of Baby Terry
After the unprecedented case of Baby K, it seemed as if the courts
were finally defending the rights of disabled infants regardless of pa-
rental consent or objections from the medical profession. But in the
year following the resolution of Baby K's case, another infant was born
who did not fare well under any of the laws providing life-sustaining
guarantees. Baby Terry was born prematurely at twenty-three weeks
gestation on May 27, 1993, in Michigan. 71 He was immediately placed
on a respirator due to respiratory distress. Baby Terry was also afflicted
with several physical infirmities, including insufficient oxygen supply
to the brain, bleeding on the brain, and bacterial and fungal infec-
tions. 72 Prior to his birth, Baby Terry's doctors had erroneously pre-
dicted that the infant would be born brain dead, and at birth they
estimated he would not live more than a day.7 3 Weeks after his birth,
doctors, still convinced of Baby Terry's uncertain future, recom-
mended that life-sustaining ventilator treatment be suspended. 74 The
treatment, however, aided Baby Terry in fighting off a bacterial infec-
tion and allowed him to breathe. 75
On June 27, 1993, the Department of Social Services intervened
and petitioned the court for a finding of child neglect, because Baby
Terry's parents chose to continue life-sustaining treatment for their
infant.76 At the hearing on the petition, the court questioned the com-
petency of Baby Terry's parents to make reasonable medical decisions
simply because the infant's mother, Rosetta Christle, asked to obtain a
second medical opinion as well as permission to seek the assistance of
other medical providers.7 7 Two days later, without considering expert
testimony or psychological testing of the parents, the court appointed
the baby's aunt as his guardian. 78 The court held that Baby Terry's
70. SeeJames Bopp, Jr. & Richard E. Coleson, Child Abuse By Whom? -Parental Rights
and Judicial Competency Determinations: The Baby K and Baby Terry Cases, 20 OHIo N.U. L. REv.
821, 823 (1994).
71. See id. at 825.
72. See id.
73. See id.
74. See id.
75. See id.
76. See id.
77. See id. at 826.
78 SP'e id at 832.
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parents were emotionally unable to understand their child's condition
and were, therefore, incompetent to make decisions for him.79
Baby Terry's parents appealed. In her appellate brief, Ms.
Christie implored the court that she was confident her child would
live based on her prior experience with her older child.80 Baby Terry's
brother, she explained, was born five and a half months premature,
weighed less at birth than Baby Terry, and had more medical
problems than Baby Terry.81 Despite these difficulties, Baby Terry's
brother experienced no medical problems as he got older and was an
"A" student.8 2 Ms. Christie also testified that she was prepared to ac-
cept the responsibility of caring for Baby Terry in the event he suf-
fered physical and/or mental disabilities. 83 Ms. Christle's arguments
were futile, and on appeal, the Genesee Circuit Court affirmed the
probate court's decision.8 4 By this time, Baby Terry had successfully
survived three months of life. Following the court's order, Baby
Terry's oxygen supply was reduced from one hundred percent to
twenty percent and, shortly thereafter, he died in his mother's arms.8 5
Ms. Christle requested leave to appeal on grounds that this type
of case was capable of repetition. 6 On December 27, 1995, Ms.
Christle's petition was denied.87
E. Current Attitudes Regarding Treatment of the Critically
Ill Child
As the cases above demonstrate, the practice of withholding med-
ical treatment from critically ill newborns is widespread. The over-
whelming number of cases show that the treating physician is often a
leading proponent of the practice. In order to understand the reasons
why the practice of withholding medical care is so widespread and to
gauge the future of the critically ill child, it is helpful to examine the
medical profession's attitude concerning treatment of the critically ill
child.
To date, no nationwide studies have been conducted to deter-
mine current hospital policies regarding the treatment of disabled
79. See id.
80. See id.
81. See id.
82. See id.
83. See id. at 833.
84. See id. at 826-27.
85. See id. at 827.
86. See id.; see also In re Terry Achtabowski, 548 N.W.2d 628 (Mich. 1995).
87. See 548 N.W.2d 628 (Mich. 1995).
[Vol. 36
newborns. However, in 1991, the Journal of the American Medical As-
sociation ('JAMA") published a revealing study regarding the atti-
tudes, and possibly the practice, of medical personnel regarding life-
sustaining treatment for disabled newborns. s8 Two hundred and forty-
seven professionals, consisting of neonatologists, neonatal fellows, pe-
diatric residents, neonatal nurses, and infant care review committee
members of six New York city hospitals-all leaders in the care of wo-
men and children infected with the HIV virus-were surveyed.8 9 The
respondents were asked questions regarding the level of treatment
they would recommend in several hypotheticals involving infants with
varying degrees of ailments.90
For the full-term infant with duodenal atresia (esophageal ob-
struction) and no other concurrent condition, all of the respondents
said they would recommend intravenous feedings; of these, 99.6%
said they would recommend intestinal surgery. 91 For the full-term in-
fant with a ventriculoseptal defect (congenital heart defect) and no
concurrent condition, 97% responded that they would recommend
open heart surgery.92 For the full-term infant with severe chronic kid-
ney damage and no other concurrent condition, 89% would recom-
mend dialysis, and 90% would recommend cardiac resuscitation if,
after suffering kidney damage, the infant suffered a cardiac arrest.9"
The number of medical professionals who would recommend
life-sustaining treatment diminished for infants born with concomi-
tant conditions. For infants afflicted with a ventriculoseptal defect,
84% of the respondents would recommend open heart surgery for the
infant with Down Syndrome or cystic fibrosis; 31% for the infant born
with Tay-Sachs disease; and only 9% for the infant born with trisomy
13 syndrome. 94
The number of respondents who would withhold treatment for
HIV-infected newborns is even more disheartening. Ninety-five per-
cent would recommend intravenous feeding and only 75% intestinal
88. See Betty Wolder Levin et al., Treatment Choice for Infants in the Neonatal Intensive
Care Unit at Risk for AIDS, 265 JAMA 2976 (1991).
89. See id. at 2976.
90. See id. at 2977.
91. See id. at 2978.
92. See id.
93. See id.
94. See id. Cystic fibrosis is a hereditary disease of the exocrine glands characterized by
breathing difficulties, infection, and fibrosis. See RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY
174 (3d ed. 1998). Trisomy 13 syndrome is a chromosomal abnormality with severe neuro-
logic impairment which almost always leads to death within the first two years of life. See
Levin et al., supra note 88, at 2979.
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surgery for the child afflicted with duodenal atresia.95 Less than half
of the respondents, 42%, would recommend open heart surgery for a
child with ventriculoseptal defect.9 6 And fewer still, only 29%, would
recommend either kidney dialysis for the child with chronic kidney
failure, or cardiac resuscitation for the child with chronic kidney fail-
ure and cardiac arrest.9 7 Many of the respondents said that if they
were certain the child was HIV-infected, they would withhold aggres-
sive medical treatments, just as they would in the case of an infant
afflicted with Tay-Sachs disease. 98 Others reported they would with-
hold some treatment from infants born to mothers infected with HIV,
despite uncertainty of the child's infection with the virus.99 The latter
group based its decision on the belief that children born to women
with AIDS would have poor quality of life due to the certain death of
the mother and poor social environment.t00 The JAMA study suggests
that medical personnel are often guided by quality of life judgments
in the treatment of the critically ill child. The more physically afflicted
a child is, the less likely medical providers are to come to the child's
aid.
In June 1999, JAMA published a study regarding the differences
in attitudes among medical professionals, children with no disabilities,
disabled children, and their parents over the quality of life and the
treatment of the critically ill child ("Saigal study").101 The study's sub-
jects were asked to rate five hypothetical health states. 102 Neonatolo-
gists and nurses had similar preferences for the five health states. 0 3
Fifty-nine percent of the physicians and sixty-eight percent of the
nurses rated one or more of the health states as worse than death.1 0 4
95. See Levin et al., supra note 88, at 2978.
96. See id.
97. See id.
98. See id. at 2980.
99. See id.
100. See id.
101. See Saroj Saigal et al., Differences in Preferences for Neonatal Outcomes Among Health
Care Professionals, Parents, and Adolescents, 281 JAMA 1991-97 (1999). A total of 742 individ-
uals were interviewed in a two-year period, including 100 neonatologists from hospitals
throughout Canada; 103 neonatal nurses from three regional neonatal intensive care units;
264 adolescents, aged twelve through sixteen years, 140 of whom were extremely low birth
weight infants; and 275 parents of the adolescents interviewed. See id. at 1991.
102. See id. at 1993. The five states were represented by children with varying degrees of
physical, emotional, and learning disabilities. See id.
103. See id. at 1991.
104. See id. The health states rated as worse than death included those represented by
children whose abilities to see, hear, and speak were partially or completely impaired.
These children also needed special equipment or assistance to eat, bathe, dress, and use
the toilet. See id.
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The health professionals rated the two most severely disabled health
states "significantly lower than [the] parents."10 5 Fifty percent of the
responding adolescents rated at least one of the health states as worse
than death, a number that was "significantly fewer than the health
professionals."10 6 The authors of the study concluded that "[w]hen
asked to rate the health-related quality of life for the hypothetical con-
ditions of children, health care professionals tend to provide lower
utility scores than do adolescents and their parents."10 7
The Saigal study cited two other studies performed on adult sub-
jects concerning adult patients in which the results were in accord
with their study regarding patient attitudes about the quality of life.10 8
In the first study, concerning end-stage renal disease, patients were
found to value their own health conditions more highly than health
professionals. 10 9 The second study concerned patients with cancer.' 10
There, researchers found that cancer patients were willing to choose
radical treatment with minimal chance of benefit. Subjects without
cancer, including health professionals, would forego radical
treatment."1
As the above studies indicate, many health professionals do not
value the life of patients to the same degree as patients or the parents
of critically ill children. These attitudes, as the Saigal study suggests,
affect decisions regarding the administration of life-saving procedures
to critically ill children.1 12 According to both studies, the future of the
critically ill child is dismal at best.
H. The Case: In re K.L
Recently, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals decided that
the state, as parens patriae, 113 could order a DNR in the child's best
105. Id. at 1994.
106. Id. at 1995.
107. Id. at 1991.
108. See id. at 1996.
109. See id. (citing D.N. Churchill et al., Measurement of quality of life in end-stage renal
disease: the time trade-off approach, 10 CLINICAL INVEST. MED. 10, 14-20 (1987)).
110. See id. (citing M.L. Slevin et al., Attitudes to chemotherapy: comparing views of patients
with cancer with those of doctors, nurses, and general public, 300 BPrT. MED. J. 1458-60 (1990)).
111. See id.
112. See NAZARIO, supra note 5, at 81 ("[Dloctors may place their own feelings and
priorities above the legal rights of the child or the parents.").
113. The term parens patriae refers to "[tihe state regarded as a sovereign; the state in
its capacity as provider of protection to those unable to care for themselves." BLACK'S LAW
DICrIONARY 1137 (7th ed. 1999).
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interest. 114 The case involved an infant girl born prematurely at
twenty-six weeks gestation, who developed broncho pulmonary dyspla-
sia, 115 and was afflicted with reactive airways disease, 116 gastro-es-
ophageal reflux, and hemoglobin SC disease (a mild variant of sickle
cell disease).1 17 The child required a heart monitor, lung medication,
and continuous oxygen. t1 8 Five weeks after baby K.I.'s release from
the hospital, the DHHS instigated child neglect proceedings against
the mother, B.I., after they were prompted by a call from K.I.'s puta-
tive father' 1 9 to the hospital. LI. was removed from her mother's cus-
tody and placed in a hospital.1 20 On July 21, 1998, nearly seven
months after K.I. was taken from her mother, KI. was transferred to
another hospital where, on the same day, she experienced cardiac ar-
rest and hypoxia, a deprivation of oxygen to the cells and to the
brain. 2 1 The following day she suffered a seven hour seizure which
was controlled with Phenobarbital medication. 22 The medication
caused KI. to lapse into a "pentobarblike coma."' 23 On August 22,
1998, K.I. was returned to the hospital, where she continued to experi-
ence medical problems. 124
On August 26, 1998, the hearing on the neglect petition was held.
The petition alleged that B.I. would sometimes remove the oxygen
and monitor from the child and failed to give her lung medication.12 5
The neglect petition also alleged that K.I.'s mother failed to schedule
the child for medical appointments. In court, a DHHS employee testi-
fied that B.I. smelled of alcohol, was incoherent, and could not walk
straight when he initially contacted her. 126 The trial court found K.I.
was a neglected child based solely on the testimony of the DHHS em-
114. See In re K.I., 735 A.2d 448, 467 (D.C. 1999).
115. Broncho pulmonary dysplasia is "an abnormal condition of the lung cells which
requires a child to use oxygen." Id. at 451.
116. Reactive airways disease is a lung condition "characterized by wheezing." Id.
117. Sickle cell disease is "a chronic hereditary anemia ... in which oxygen-deficient
blood cells assume a crescent shape." RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY 666 (3d ed.
1998).
118. See In re K.., 735 A.2d at 451.
119. "D.M." did not submit to a paternity test, but nonetheless claimed that he was
K..'s father. See id. at 451 n.1.
120. See id. at 451.
121. See id. at 451-52.
122. See id. at 452.
123. Id.
124. See id.
125. See id.
126. See id. In addition, KI.'s father testified that B.I. consumed three beers on a daily
basis and became intoxicated. See id.
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ployee and the child's father. 127 K.I.'s mother did not attend the hear-
ing in which the court determined that, although she had liberty
interests in the child, she had placed the child at risk through her
drinking and failure to provide care. 128
Because of KLI.'s continued medical problems, the trial court
held a hearing to determine whether aggressive resuscitation efforts
should be employed in the event KI. suffered pulmonary or respira-
tory arrest.129 The child's medical guardian ad litem requested a DNR
order.130 The guardian called six expert witnesses, only one of whom
was K.I.'s treating physician. 13' Expert testimony revealed that KI. was
not dependent on significant life support measures; she was able to
breathe on her own and her heart beat independently. 132 Yet, one
expert described RI. as neurologically devastated and, while capable
of feeling pain and discomfort, was incapable of reacting to her envi-
ronment, understanding the events around her, and giving or receiv-
ing love.133 All of the expert witnesses recommended that no
aggressive efforts at resuscitation be taken.134
The trial court issued a DNR order which provided that "[i] n the
event of cardiac and/or pulmonary arrest, the following procedures
for resuscitation shall represent the exclusive methods of intervention
to be performed on [KI.]: (1) Blow by Oxygen[;] (2) Bag-Mask Venti-
lation[; and] (3) Intra-muscular & Sub-cutaneous Medications." 35
K.I.'s mother appealed the trial court's decision, contending that she,
as the parent, had the right to decide whether KI. should be resusci-
tated.' 36 KI.'s mother also argued that the court erred in applying the
best interests of the child standard rather than the substituted judg-
ment standard in issuing the DNR. She also argued that the court
erred in employing the preponderance of the evidence standard in
the neglect proceedings rather than the clear and convincing evi-
127. See id. at 451 n.2.
128. See id.
129. See id. at 458.
130. See id. at 457.
131. See id. at 458. The other experts included Dr. GabrielJacob Hauser, a Georgetown
University bioethics professor; Dr. Noreen Crain, a fellow in the Critical Care Unit at Chil-
dren's Hospital; Reverend Jeanne Brienneis, a bioethics expert; and Dr. TomasJose Silber,
a physician and chairman of the hospital's office of ethics. See id. at 458-59.
132. See id. at 458.
133. See id.
134. See id. at 458-59.
135. Id. at 450.
136. See id.
Fall 2001]) IN RE K-.
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
dence standard. 37 KI.'s father supported the DNR order, but com-
plained that the trial court should have recognized his right to
parental privacy and parental autonomy. 138
On appeal, the court agreed that the trial court had the author-
ity, as parens patriae, to rule in the best interests of the child.1 39 The
trial court had held:
[T] he issuance of [a] DNR order must be predicated upon a find-
ing by clear and convincing evidence both that it is in [K.I.'s] best
interests to forego aggressive revival measures, and that [B.I.'s] re-
fusal to consent to the issuance of the DNR order is unreasonably
contrary to [K.I.'s] well-being.140
The appellate court held that "in exercising its role as parens pa-
triae... the trial court, carefully and thoughtfully, determined by clear
and convincing evidence that it was in K.I.'s best interest to avoid use
of aggressive resuscitation efforts which cause pain and discom-
fort."'14 1 Based on this finding, the court upheld the DNR order.' 4 2
I. The K.L Court Failed to Adhere to Current Principles
and State Law in Terminating a Parent's Rights
to Her Child
A. The Rights of Parents to Make Medical Decisions on Behalf of
a Child Is Limited by the States' Interest in Protecting
Children
The parents' role in making medical decisions for a child is based
upon the "special relationship that parents have with their children
[giving] rise to reciprocal rights and obligations."' 43' , According to one
scholar, a parent's right over his child is protected by the United
States Constitution, which affords parents the right to "establish a
home and bring up children."'144 "This right is not because of 'abso-
lute authority over family members, but rather because society be-
137. See id.; see also discussion infra Part III.B.
138. See In re K., 735 A.2d at 450.
139. See id.
140. Id. at 456.
141. Id.
142. See id.
143. James Bopp, Jr., Protection of Disabled Newborns: Are There Constitutional Limitations?,
1 ISSUEs L. & MED. 173, 177 (1985).
144. Id. at 180 (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)).
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lieves that parental authority usually will be exercised to advance the
children's welfare.' "145
However, a parent's right over a child is not absolute. "Parental
rights are limited by the interests of the child and the responsibilities
of the state .... [P]arents do not have the right to act contrary to the
child's welfare."' 46 In fact, the Constitution does not protect a parent
who either abuses or neglects a child. 147 Included in the definition of
abuse or neglect are decisions by parents to withhold treatment from
handicapped newborns. 148 It is in this situation that states take an ac-
tive role in protecting children on grounds that the preservation of
life is one of the most compelling state interests.1 49 "The state has a
compelling interest in insuring that all of its citizens' Fourteenth
Amendment's [sic] right to life is protected."' 50 Thus, when a child's
right to life is threatened by abusive or neglectful parents, the state, as
parens patriae, may intervene to protect the child. 151
B. As Parens Patriae, the State Has Authority to Act in the Child's
Best Interest
The term parens patriae literally means "parent of his country"
and refers to the traditional role of the state as the sovereign and
guardian of its minor citizens.15 2 Today the power is vested in each
state and is particularly relevant in guardianship law. 153 Parens patriae
is the state's authority to limit parental freedom and authority in mat-
ters affecting a child's welfare.15 4 Under the state's supervision, ap-
pointed guardians act in the best interests of the child. 55
145. Id. (quoting Halderman v. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 707 F.2d 702, 712 (3d
Cir. 1983) (Rosenn, J., concurring)).
146. Id. at 181.
147. See id. at 183.
148. See id.
149. See id.
150. Id.
151. See id. at 181.
152. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1137 (7th ed. 1999). The doctrine of parens patriae re-
gards the state as "the ultimate parent of every child." JOSEPH M. HAWES, THE CHILDREN'S
RIGHTS MOVEMENT: A HISTORY OF ADVOCACY AND PROTECTION 2 (1991) ("When the morals,
or safety, or interests of the children require it, the courts could intervene and withdraw
the infants from the custody of the father or mother and place the care and custody of
them elsewhere.") (citations omitted).
153. See Daniel B. Griffith, The Best Interests Standard: A Comparison of the State's Parens
Patriae Authority and Judicial Oversight in Best Interests Determinations for Children and Incompe-
tent Patients, 7 ISSUES L. & MED. 283, 288 (1991).
154. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 167 (1944).
155. See Griffith, supra note 153, at 288.
Fall 2001]
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
Instead of seeking to abrogate a parent's rights completely,
"[u] nder the parens patriae doctrine, the state seeks to protect family
autonomy and the parents' right to the companionship, care, custody,
and management of their children."'156
The fundamental liberty interest of natural parents .. .does not
evaporate simply because they have not been model parents or
have lost temporary custody of their child to the State. Even when
blood relationships are strained, parents retain a vital interest in
preventing the irretrievable destruction of their family life.157
Thus, courts must provide parents with fair procedural protections. 158
The state must also support its allegations of parental incompetence
by at least clear and convincing evidence. 159
The best interests of the child standard is the leading standard
used by courts to terminate a parent's rights to the care and custody of
a child upon clear and convincing evidence of abuse or neglect. 16°1 In
its inception, the standard treated the child as an object to be owned,
but today the standard is a flexible one making the needs of the child
its focus.' 6 1 However, no uniform standard exists which states may ap-
ply in every given situation.1 62 This lack of uniformity engenders a
standard which is "indeterminative and speculative, vague, broad and
elusive, subject to ajudge's subjective value judgments, and conducive
to overgeneralization instead of meticulous fact-finding." 63 In es-
sence, the courts are afforded ample discretion in determining what is
in the child's best interest. 64 Even in those states which provide fac-
tors to be considered in determining the child's best interests, the
courts alone decide the weight to give each factor.165
In the medical setting, "the best interests of the child will favour
the provision of life-sustaining treatment."' 66 In those circumstances
in which the best interests of the child may be uncertain, "[t]he pre-
156. Id. at 289.
157. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982).
158. See id. at 753-54.
159. See id. at 769.
160. See Griffith, supra note 153, at 283. The best interest of the child has been defined
"as the balance of potential benefit over potential harm or distress resulting from the pur-
suit of a given line of treatment." Bioethics Committee, Canadian Paediatric Society, supra
note 1.
161. See Griffith, supra note 153, at 292.
162. See id. at 295.
163. Id. (citations omitted).
164. See id.
165. See id. at 299-300.
166. Bioethics Committee, Canadian Paediatric Society, supra note 1.
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supposition . . should be in favour of life-saving or sustaining
treatment." 1
67
Nevertheless, restraints have been placed on a state's parens pa-
triae power to interfere in the family relationship. 168 This check on
the state's power is consistent with the premise that a child's interest is
best served when the child is placed in the custody of his parents. 69
The current trend is to preserve the family unit and employ rehabilita-
tive efforts to solve family problems, instead of merely protecting the
child from abuse and neglect. 170 The "termination of parental rights
determinations become [sic] necessary only when rehabilitative ef-
forts have broken down .... [T]ermination of parental rights pro-
ceedings generally represent [sic] the final stage of state
intervention.' 7 1
As mentioned above, the court in K.L determined it was in the
child's best interests to terminate K.I.'s mother's parental rights and
affirm an order not to resuscitate the child in the event of heart or
respiratory failure.172 The court found "by clear and convincing evi-
dence"'173 that the child had been neglected pursuant to District of
Columbia Code sections 16-2301 (9) (B), (C), and (F).174
District of Columbia Code section 16-2320(a),'175 from which the
court derived its power to terminate B.I.'s parental rights, 176 provides
for the rehabilitation of the parent found to be in violation of section
16-2301. Section 16-2320 provides in part:
If a child is found to be neglected, the Division exercising juvenile
jurisdiction shall also have jurisdiction over any natural person who
is a parent or caretaker of the child to secure the parent or care-
taker's full cooperation and assistance in the entire rehabilitative
process and may order any of the following dispositions which will
167. Id.
168. See Griffith supra note 153, at 299.
169. See id.
170. See id.
171. Id.
172. See In re K.., 735 A.2d 448, 450 (D.C. 1999).
173. Id. at 452.
174. See id. at 451 n.2. The Code states that a neglected child is one:
(B) who is without proper parental care or control . . . necessary for his or her
physical, mental, or emotional health, and the deprivation is not due to the lack
of financial means of his or her parent... ; (C) whose parent ... is unable to
discharge his or her responsibilities to and for the child because of incarceration,
hospitalization, or other physical or mental incapacity; or . . . (F) who has re-
ceived negligent treatment or maltreatment from his or her parent ....
D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-2301(9) (B), (C), (F) (Supp. 2001).
175. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2320(a) (Supp. 2001).
176. See 735 A.2d at 453-54.
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be in the best interest of the child: (1) [p]ermit the child to re-
main with his or her parent . . . subject to such conditions and
limitations as the Division may prescribe, including ... the follow-
ing services for the child and his or her parent . . . (A) medical,
psychiatric, or other treatment at an appropriate facility under pro-
tective supervision; (B) parenting classes; and (C) family
counseling. 177
Contrary to the principle of fair procedural protections prior to
the termination of parental rights, B.I.'s rights in the instant action
were terminated at a hearing which she did not attend.17 8 According
to the "fair procedural" scheme noted above, the court had a duty to
allow B.I. the right to be heard. Similarly, the court should not have
based its decision on the testimony of a social services employee who
knew B.I. for less than a day and the testimony of a man who had not
been proven to be K.I.'s biological father. The court employed no ef-
forts to rehabilitate the mother, whom the court found suffered from
a drinking problem. 179 According to current parens patriae principles
and the law of the state in which the case was decided, it was the
court's duty to attempt to rehabilitate the mother in an effort to pre-
serve the family. Instead, the K.L court immediately instigated a pro-
cedure which should only be used as a means of last resort. The court
summarily and irretrievably terminated B.I.'s rights to her child.
IV. A New Perspective in Making Decisions Regarding the
Critically Ill Newborn
As the cases in Part I of this Note demonstrate, the courts have
been inconsistent in ordering or withholding medical treatment from
critically ill infants. The courts have ordered the withdrawal of life-
saving procedures from infants whose ailments were treatable and not
life threatening, as in the cases of the Bloomington Baby and Baby
Terry. The courts have also ordered life prolonging treatment in the
cases of infants who have no chance of survival, as in the case of Baby
Jane Doe. Much of the inconsistency is due to the assortment of laws
available to the courts, the application of which can lead to a variety of
outcomes. Some of the inconsistency is due in part to the subjective
views of parents, judges, and medical personnel. 180 In an effort to
177. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-2320(a)(1)(A)-(C).
178. See In re KI., 735 A.2d at 451 n.2.
179. See id. The court had determined KI. was a neglected child in part because her
mother "frequently consumed alcohol." Id. at 454.
180. See NAZARIO, supra note 5, at 80.
Unfortunate, too, is the fact that all too often, many of the decisions made by
parents and doctors in these circumstances turn out later to have been less than
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curb the arbitrariness of decisions involving critically ill infants, a uni-
form rule whereby decisions are based primarily on the sanctity of the
life of the child must be adopted. Such a rule would be similar to that
applied to the incompetent adult in the case of Cruzan v. Missouri De-
partment of Health. 181
In Cruzan, Nancy Cruzan was left in a persistent vegetative state
due to injuries sustained in an automobile accident. 18 2 Ms. Cruzan's
parents, as co-guardians, sought a court order for the withdrawal of
nutrition and hydration when it became apparent that Ms. Cruzan
would not recover her cognitive faculties. 183 The Missouri Supreme
Court reversed the lower court's grant of the order, noting that the
"state's interest is not in quality of life [but] in life [itself]; that inter-
est is unqualified."'184 The United States Supreme Court affirmed on
grounds that the testimony of Ms. Cruzan's roommate at trial did not
amount to clear and convincing evidence of Ms. Cruzan's wishes to
have hydration and nutrition withdrawn.' 8 5 An incompetent person,
the Court emphasized, "is not able to make an informed and volun-
tary choice to exercise a hypothetical right to refuse treatment or any
other right."18 6 The Court reasoned,
[A] State has more particular interests at stake. The choice be-
tween life and death is a deeply personal decision of obvious and
overwhelming finality .... [A] State may properly decline to make
judgments about the "quality" of life that a particular individual
may enjoy, and simply assert an unqualified interest in the preser-
vation of human life to be weighed against the constitutionally pro-
tected interests of the individual.1 87
The Court continued,
[a]n erroneous decision not to terminate results in a maintenance
of the status quo; the possibility of subsequent developments such
for the good of the child. This may be because often parents find themselves
feeling guilty, grief-ridden, or even embarrassed about the child. They may have
conflicting interests in maintaining previous life plans and avoiding the psychic
and financial costs associated with the care of a handicapped child or may make
decisions in haste or without full knowledge or disclosure about the extent of the
child's defects and future.
Id.
181. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
182. See id. at 266.
183. See id. at 265.
184. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 420 (Mo. 1988).
185. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 285. Ms. Cruzan allegedly had a "serious conversation with
a housemate friend that if sick or injured she would not wish to continue her life unless she
could live at least halfway normally." Id. at 268.
186. Id. at 280.
187. Id. at 281-82.
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as advancements in medical science, . . . changes in the law, or
simply the unexpected death of the patient despite the administra-
tion of life-sustaining treatment at least create the potential that a
wrong decision will eventually be corrected or its impact mitigated.
An erroneous decision to withdraw life-sustaining treatment, how-
ever, is not susceptible of correction.188
In so stating, the Court decided that life, rather than quality of
life, was worth preserving absent clear and convincing evidence of the
patient's wish to die.
In its analysis, the Cruzan Court cited In re Storar,'8 9 a case involv-
ing a "profoundly retarded" fifty-two year old man who "was always
totally incapable of understanding or making a reasoned decision
about medical treatment."190 The man's mother refused to consent to
continued blood transfusions necessary to treat her son's terminal
bladder cancer.' 9 ' In terminating the mother's parental rights, the
court found the denial of the mother's petition appropriate because
"courts may not permit a parent to deny a child all treatment for a
condition which threatens his life."' 9 2 The court held that because the
patient was "[m] entally ... an infant[,] . .. that is the only realistic way
to assess his rights . . . ."19 As parens patriae, the court intervened to
protect the health and welfare of the "child." With Storar, the court
effectively demonstrated that withholding treatment cases involving
infants and incompetent adults are essentially the same under a
parens patriae analysis.
There is a danger that the trend in inconsistent court decisions
regarding the disabled infant may continue. This is evidenced by the
studies of the American Medical Association 94 and the Saigal re-
search team,'19 5 as well as the recent decision of In re KI.'196 To abate
this trend, the same respect accorded to incompetent adults in the
throes of disabling physical conditions must be extended to the dis-
abled child. The application of this right is not difficult in the case of
the disabled infant. As the Storar court held, the incompetent adult-
who is similar to an infant-must have his right to medical treatment
preserved. Thus, the sanctity of life rather than quality of life is to be
188. Id. at 283.
189. 420 N.E.2d 64 (N.Y. 1981).
190. Id. at 72.
191. See id. at 69.
192. I. at 73.
193. Id.
194. See generally Levin et al., supra note 88.
195. See generally Saigal et al., supra note 101.
196. 735 A.2d 448 (D.C. 1999).
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preserved above all in the case of the critically ill infant with treatable
ailments.
Perhaps most indicative of a critically ill child's right to medical
treatment is the study conducted by the Saigal team.1 97 The subjects
of that study, some of whom were themselves born at extremely low
birth weights, considered the lives of critically ill children valuable and
deserving of medical treatment. The Saigal study was representative of
the patient's perspective, which should be "incorporated when deter-
mining the preferred course of action."'198 This, the authors con-
cluded, "embodies the optimal patient-physician interaction."' 99
As the Court in Cruzan maintained, the decision to withdraw
medical treatment and the resulting death is a recourse from which
there is no turning back. Keeping the child alive, on the other hand,
allows for the possibility of effective treatment and scientific break-
throughs. Moreover, the unqualified right to life subverts any possibil-
ity of subjective judgments based on ideals of the quality of life.
At birth, a child has met the constitutional requirement for per-
sonhood with full rights including a right to life. To leave the fate
of a handicapped newborn to the interested discretion of parents
and doctors is a complete and arbitrary denial of due process and
equal protection .... [I] t is not the court's function to heed the
"stringent cry in America to terminate the lives of other people-
deemed physically or mentally defective." It is the court's function
to secure for each person an opportunity for life. 200
Conclusion
In 1982, the American public denounced with horror the deci-
sion of the Indiana couple who decided to starve their child to death
instead of subjecting him to life-saving treatment. 20 1 Since then, hospi-
tals and the states have made the decision to withhold treatment from
the critically ill newborn, despite the parents' plea to keep the child
alive. One positive note, however, is the finding of the 1991 JAMA
study202 that medical personnel today are less inclined to let a child
die who is afflicted with the same medical maladies as the Blooming-
ton Baby. But as the same study indicates, many more would recom-
mend withholding treatment from infants afflicted with more severe
197. See generally Saigal et al., supra note 101.
198. Id. at 1996.
199. Id.
200. Bopp, supra note 143, at 186.
201. See, e.g., Lisa Blumberg, The Natural Destiny of the Bloomington Baby, Ragged Edge
Online, at http://www.ragged-edge-mag.com/0700/0700ftl.htm (July/Aug. 2000).
202. See Levin et al., supra note 88.
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health problems, including children who may be infected with the
HIV virus. As demonstrated by the case of In re K.L, the courts also
continue to allow the withholding of treatment from children who
have treatable illnesses. Much more must be done to halt what re-
mains the subjective practice of withholding medical treatment to crit-
ically ill newborns.
It is extremely important that we remember that the vast majority
of handicapped newborns go on to lead productive lives. Many
grow strong, learn to read, care for themselves, and with some
luck, enjoy life, love, and the love of others. As do all children, they
bring with them varying amounts of burdens and rewards. 2 °:3
Perhaps a uniform law which grants every newborn the unconditional
right to life, unfettered by arbitrary medical or legal judgments, is in
order.
203. NAZAR1O, supra note 5, at 83.
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